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SOCIAL CONTROL OR SOCIAL WAGE:
ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE "WELFARE STATE"
Paul Adams
School of Social Work
The University of Texas at Austin

Discussion between liberal apologists for the "welfare state" and their radical
critics has tended in recent years to focus on the question of "social control." In
this area the corporate liberals and social democrats (the "welfare statists") are
weak. They talk of the "welfare state" as if, at least in principle, it represented
the collective assumption by society of responsibility for the basic needs and depenInsofar as "social control" is relevant for them, it has to
dencies of its members.
1
do with society's exercise of restraint over the selfish pursuit of private profit.
Radical critics of the "welfare state," on the other hand, point to its controlling
and system-maintenance functions, but often neglect the real benefits it provides.
They have exposed the police officer, the guard, or (to use the old Wobbly term) the
head-fixer behind the caring smile of the social worker, the teacher, and the therapist. Even the provision of material benefits--social security, public welfare,
health and housing subsidies--is seen as reinforcing or regulating market forces in
the interests of order and efficiency, rather than modifying them to meet human need.
Where conservatives have seen "creeping socialism," radicals have seen the intervention of the capitalist state to stabilize and reinforce the system.
To remain on this terrain in a period of economic instability, fiscal crises,
welfare cuts, and the general collapse of New Deal liberalism in the face of these
It reflects a one-sided and therefore inadequate
developments, is an indulgence.
understanding of the "welfare state." Government social welfare programs do certainly have a social control function, but they in many cases also constitute part of
what may be called the "social wage." My purpose here is to distinguish these elements, to draw attention to the concept of the social wage and some of its difficulties, and to draw some political conclusions.
I want to begin with certain conditions which are necessary for the accumulation
Starting with the simplest possible model of capitalism as a mode of proof capital.
duction (that is, a way in which people cooperate together to produce the means of
life), we can see that the owners of capital must pay for the labor-power they buy at
least a certain minimum. This must be enough to ensure the maintenance and reproduction of labor-power at an adequate level of health, education, and security. Adequacy
is here a matter of what is required at a given level of technological and cultural
development to produce an efficient work force. These capital costs of production
include the maintenance not only of the presently active labor force but also of past
and future workers. They must, that is, be sufficient to support the worker and his
2
If the worker is to be fit for the job, and the work force is not to
or her family.
be depleted, capital must pay at least a certain minimum for the labor-power it hires.
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We can imagine these costs being met entirely in the form of wages. Workers would
then have to provide for their own immediate needs and those of their dependents
(including their education), as well as insuring against the needs and dependencies
of sickness, accidents, old age, unemployment, and so on--all from their paychecks.
On the other hand, workers must produce for their employers not only the value
of their own labor-power (that is, enough to cover the costs of its production), and
not only enough to cover wear and tear on physical plant, etc., but also a surplus
which, if the product can be sold and certain other conditions met, will enable the
employers to reinvest, buying more machinery or hiring more workers. Out of this
surplus, however, various expenses must also be met, including those of the capitalists' own living and the hire of their personal servants. More significantly for our
purposes, these expenses include the costs of maintaining the social conditions in
which production and accumulation can proceed on the basis of capitalist property relations. We can imagine each capitalist meeting these expenses individually, hiring
not only his/her own managers and security guards, but also ideologues and propagandists, private army, police, and human relations experts.
Historically, however, both the capital costs of production and the expenses of
ensuring its taking place under capitalist relations have been met in part, an increasing part, through the state. This is so clearly the case with regard to the
expenses of production that the state may be defined as that social institution with
the primary function of maintaining order and harmony in the relations of production.
The mechanisms for carrying out this function include army, police, courts, state
bureaucracy, and schools insofar as they serve an ideological or "head-fixing" purpose. In whatever form these aspects of the state's activity are financed, they
constitute in essence taxes on capital. That is, they are part of the price that
capital has to pay for the maintenance of the system.
On the other hand, the state has also increasingly socialized the wage system,
in the sense of taking over from individual capitals part of the task of providing
for the production and reproduction of labor-power. Put differently, the worker's
standard of living depends not only upon what he or she takes home in his or her
paycheck, but also upon the goods and services provided by the state. Indeed,
according to one minister in the British Labor government, Barbara Castle:
The most important part of the standard of living of most of us
depends on the great complex of services we call "public expenditure." They are not only the key to the quality of life; they
are the key to equality. . .The great advances ...have come...
from better education, better health services, better housing
and better care of the old, the disabled and the handicapped in
3
life.

Castle gives special emphasis to that 60% of "public expenditure" which, in the government's calculations, goes to the "social wage." She goes so far as to claim that
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"the taxman is the Robin Hood of our time, taking from those who can afford it
the means whereby we can pay every worker the wage that really matters, the social
4
wage."
The social wage, as I am using the term, does not include all public expenditure.
It is defined as those costs of labor-power which take the form of benefits
and services provided by the state, and is distinguished both from other forms of
wage paid directly by the employer (take-home and fringe benefits) and from other
types of state activity (policing or "system-maintenance," as well as non-labor, or
constant, social capital costs). The social wage is not, of course, co-extensive
with government social welfare expenditures. These support a wide range of activities which may have either a "social control" function (helping to police the
existing social and economic order) or a social wage function (providing real benefits to workers and their families which improve their standard of living); or they
may combine both functions.
When we move from the apparently clear distinction between social control
(social expenses of production) and social wage (the labor element of social capital
costs), to particular cases of social welfare expenditures, the problems multiply.
Governments which employ the concept of the "social wage" (these include Russia and
New Zealand as well as Britain) tend to use it ideologically, to disguise the coercive or policing aspects of certain state activities. Thus, the British government
calculates the social wage as the amount of current and capital public spending on
a number of programs for each member of the working population. These programs include not only social security (both "insurance" and assistance programs), health,
education, and certain subsidies, including food, nationalized industries' price
restraint, and transportation--but also, law and order! 5 The assumption is evidently that the primary function of the forces of law and order is the preservation
of the lives and property of the working population.
James O'Connor, in The Fiscal Crisis of the State, distinguishes capital costs
of production from expenses of production and describes how both have increasingly
been socialized. 6
In dealing with specific programs, however, he assigns social security insurance programs to the former category but "welfare" (assistance) programs
to the latter. Here the assumption appears to be that welfare clients constitute a
";surplus population" who exist outside production but must, from a capitalist viewpoint, be kept alive in the interest of public order. This may, in part, be correct.
But most welfare clients have worked before going on welfare, and will work again
when they are off, while many continue to work while receiving benefits. In 1973,
only 22% of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) had never
been employed. Indeed, AFDC has been seen as the functional equivalent for lowpaid work of maternity leave benefits in the better paid sector of the economy, or
as a poor person's unemployment insurance. 7
In any case, the dependent children
aided by the program will in most cases enter the (secondary) labor market though
they may well face long periods of unemployment: the cost of raising them is part
of the cost of reproducing the labor force, rather than an expense of maintaining
a permanently surplus population. At the same time, AFDC clearly does have strong
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social control elements. Piven and Cloward argue that public welfare functions to
8
While social insurance also
maintain order and to regulate the labor market.
functions this way, AFDC recipients are subject to an extraordinary degree of coer9
cive social control over their lives as a condition of receiving aid.
Education and personal social services are areas where it is particularly difficult to separate social control from social wage elements. Real benefits may be
provided which constitute an enhancement of the recipient's standard of living,
while reduced provision may constitute a cut in real living standards. While teachers and social workers provide these benefits, however, they may at the same time
act as policing agents through the exercise of more or less open coercion
or as
10
ideological agents for the transmission of dominant norms and values.
Further difficulties arise when one attempts, as the British government is
doing, to quantify the social wage and measure increases and decreases in it. Very
large rates of increase may appear--a recent Times (London) article was headed
"Social Wage Trebled in Six Years" 11 --without there being any real improvement in
the level of provision made to individual recipients. The increase may go entirely
to cover the effects of general inflation, as well as disproportionate increases in
land costs and interest rates, increased drug prices or payments to physicians, or
increases in numbers of recipients due to such factors as higher unemployment, or a
higher proportion of the old and young in the total population. 12 An adequate empirical measure of the social wage would need to include only those forms of provision
which constitute (or to the extent that they constitute) real benefits rather than
policing expenses--and this is a political question to which we cannot expect to
find a satisfactory answer from any existing government. It would also need to record and aggregate real, physical improvements or declines in the quality and
quantity of provision.
I do not know whether these problems are soluble. The
political importance of the social wage, however, does not depend on its calculability.
In specific social welfare programs, I have suggested, social control and social
wage elements may be nextricably entangled. The distinction is important nonetheless. Those who see all social services simply and inherently as policing or social
controi activities and for whom that is a condemnation, have no obvious grounds for
opposing cutbacks in social welfare expenditures. Radicals would presumably have no
objection to cuts in funding for the army, police, or Central Intelligence Agency.
How is social welfare different?
It is different, in my view, because cutbacks in social welfare expenditures
can amount to a disguised wage cut and be part of a government strategy to hold down
personal and social consumption in order to maintain profitability and encourage investment. 13 Such a strategy is difficult to resist, the more so if it is not perceived as an attack on workers' living standards. Cutbacks in education or health
and welfare programs are not as direct or obvious (unless they involve transfer payments) as a reduction in one's take-home pay. They tend to affect most those least
able to resist: the old, the young, the disabled, the sick. In the United States

-49-

especially, it is possible to present such cuts as an increase in the proportion of
one's earnings which are disposable by oneself rather than by the state, even though
they may in fact constitute an overall reduction in living standards.
The concept of the social wage draws attention to the fact that social security, education, health programs, and welfare are as much part of the real income of
working class families as the paycheck. The income is disposed of by the capitalist
state on behalf of those families, who exercise neither individual nor collective
control over it, but a cutback is a reduction in real income for all that.
Given the obvious advantages of the social wage as the locus for an attack on
consumption, it is somewhat surprising that the British Labor government should, in
the course of such an attack, seek to give the concept wide currency. In part, its
doing so reflects the uneasy co-existence of a real, if misguided, concern with
social justice on one hand and a commitment to maintaining the competitiveness and
profitability of British industry in a hostile world on the other. The "Joint Framework for Social Policies" developed by the Central Policy Review Staff for the government emphasizes the importance of developing an index of the social wage.1 4 But
it does so in the context of a need to rationalize and prioritize social expenditure
in a period of economic difficulty. That is, cuts must be made, so let us ensure
that what is left goes with maximum effectiveness where we consciously decide it
should go. (In a similar vein, the last Labor government, of 1964-70, introduced
its incomes policy with much discussion of how the better off workers should restrain
themselves so that more could go to the lower-paid.
In the event, wage controls
proved effective only against the weaker and lower-paid sections of labor. In general, advances by lower paid workers occur in the wake of and depend on the gains
won by stronger and better paid sections of workers. 15
In this case, too, we may
be confident that business, not those in greatest need, will benefit from the prioritizing of cutbacks.)
Furthermore, the policy of relying on the cooperation of union bureaucrats to
induce acceptance by their members of cuts in real wages, despite its current success, is uncertain and inadequate. The social wage provides another line of attack,
and one which can be made to appear very reasonable. Government ministers and civil
servants have pointed out the rapid rises in the social wage, while failing to mention some of the reasons for them discussed above. Thus Chancellor of the Exchequer
Dennis Healey in his April 1975 Budget speech said that the social wage now amounted
tof lOOa for every adult member of the working population in Britain, and observed
that the "social wage has been increasing very much faster than ordinary wages-much faster than prices too. " 16 The Central Policy Review Staff's report notes that
public expenditure has been growing faster than production as
a whole, and expenditure on social programs has been growing
faster than the rest of public expenditure.

"This," it affirms, "cannot go on.",17

In this context it is to the government's

-50-

advantage to make the social wage visible, so that workers and others will feel
personally responsible for the country's economic troubles and recognize the
necessity of cuts in social spending so that inflation can be reduced and the
economy restored to health. 18
Cutting the social wage, then, is one way in which a government can try to
switch resources from consumption to investment.
It has many advantages, but is
nevertheless a dangerous strategy because it translates the struggle over wages and
profits from the economic to the political sphere. In doing so, it breaks down the
reformist barriers between the economic and the political, between struggles over
wages and conditions on one hand, and political power on the other. Many kinds of
state intervention, from the use of police to break a picket line to the imposition
of wage controls, involve workers in conflict with the state as well as the employer. The social wage has assumed such importance in the last forty years1 9 that the
defense of living standards now leads beyond a conflict with employer over wages and
conditions, and only incidentally with the state insofar as it actively intervenes.
It also involves a struggle over social policy, over what proportion of the total
social product should go to what purposes and who should decide. As both opponents
of capitalism like O'Connor and supporters like Daniel Bell have pointed out, this
increasing politicization of the economy holds dangers for the system in terms both
20
of generating unmeetable demands and of undermining the legitimacy of the market.
What they usually have not pointed out is that while the economy has been politicized
the state has in turn been increasingly subordinated to the demands of the economy.
The competitive drive to accumulate capital is no less compulsive, and no less the
central dynamic of the system, for being increasingly international in form, or for
involving the state. Competition has not become subordinate to political decisionmaking, but rather the reverse. Governments are more and more held responsible for
the functioning of the economy, but subject as they are to the pressures of international competition, they have less and less room to maneuver.
As governments, especially in Europe, have attempted to solve the problems of
their economies by cutting the social wage, so they have elicited a more generalized
and political response from workers. In recent years, with the faltering of the
twenty year post-war expansion and stability, workers have found that they cannot
make gains, or defend what they have, by relying on union bureaucrats or fragmented
and localized struggles. They can no longer rely on being able to make up for reduced public provision with increased fringe benefits or higher wages as they did
in the 1950's and 1960's.21 They are still far from a unified, class-wide political
response, even in countries with a stronger socialist tradition and more socialist
militants. But the experience that neither shop-floor militancy nor the negotiations
of labor leaders have prevented the closure of schools and hospitals, or the decline
of provision for the aging, has produced different kinds of action by industrial
workers.
In 1974, dockworkers, coalminers and others struck in support of nurses
during their pay dispute in England. Construction workers went on strike in support
of higher old age benefits in 1972, also in England. In Italy there have been major
strikes over housing and social security, and other actions against rent, bus fare,
and food price increases. 2 2 These struggles have sometimes involved elements of
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That is, workers on the job and as consumers have demanded and
workers' control.
in some instances taken some control of their "social" wage--not only how much it
should be but how it should be spent. The demand for workers' control of the
social wage is, of course, a quite different demand from that of the conservative
''individualist" who wants it largely eliminated in favor of the individual paycheck, or higher corporate profits. This is true even though both demands express,
23
from different perspectives, a suspicion of the state and its bureaucracy.
A one-sided emphasis on the social control aspects of the welfare state, then,
leaves one ill-equipped for the actual battles which have to be fought in defense
of social welfare programs. Cutbacks in social expenditures have to be opposed as
strongly as if they were reductions in wages (although successful opposition to such
cuts requires that the reformist separation of the economic--trade-union--from the
political--Labor Party, etc.--struggle be overcome, and that the economic power of
working people be politically organized and directed).
This does not imply uncritical acceptance of social welfare programs in their present form, including their
coercive "social control" aspects.
Indeed, defending the social wage involves conflict with the state which is its guardian, but which at the same time subordinates
it to other priorities. An effective defense is likely to bring that guardianship
into question.
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